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Note
Is This Really the End of Duty?:
The Evolution of the Third Restatement of Torts
JordanK Kolar*
With a little imagination, the story could read more like
film noir than legal doctrine. A group of legal scholars-let us

call them the "Negligence Nine"--gather secretly in a poorly lit
basement in the wrong part of town. Through the cigar smoke
and the smell of stale booze, they fiddle anxiously with their
fedoras and consider their options: "This Duty character has
given us trouble from the beginning," one complains. From the
shadows, a raspy voice and a radical proposal: "I've said from
the beginning that we never needed him-why don't we finish
the job that Prosser started?"' Some nod soberly and some
feign shock, but all mull over the same question: Is this really
the end of Duty?
In May of 1999, the notably less shrouded American Law
Institute (ALI) convened to consider exactly such a proposal.
The previous month, Reporter Gary Schwartz had presented for
the Members' consideration the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
General Principles, the third and final volume of the Third
* J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1997,
Carleton College, Northfield, MN. This Note benefited from the efforts of Rozi
Bhimani, Mary Pat Byrn, Dan Herber, Alexis Pheiffer, James P. Toomey, and
the staff and editors of the Minnesota Law Review. I would like to dedicate
this Note to my parents, Britton and Margaret Kolar, to whose support I owe
all of my success, and to MPJ's.
1. For the suggestion that Prosser was famously opposed to the
centrality of duty in negligence law, see John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law,
54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 661-62 (2001). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 7, Reporters'

Note cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) [hereinafter TENTATIVE DRAFT No.
2] (observing Prosser's suggestion that the concept of duty did not develop
until negligence emerged as a distinct theory of liability, and even then was
only employed "in order to confine the scope of liability" (citing William
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1953))).
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Restatement project.2 Schwartz's draft had removed duty as a
prima facie element of negligence. 3 The General Principles
volume was supposed to have been the end of the Third
4
Restatement project, but it was actually only the beginning.
Almost everything about the Third Restatement project
has been different from previous efforts. 5 Where the volumes of
previous Restatements sought to restate general areas of tort
6
law (to which individual volumes were generally dedicated),
the third volume purported to be a "doctrinal elaboration of the
7
core subject of the law of torts, liability for physical harm." It
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Discussion Draft 1999) [hereinafter DISCUSSION DRAFT].
3. Id. § 3; see also text accompanying infra note 50 (quoting the full text
of the Discussion Draft's section 3).
4. See infra note 5 (describing the progression of the Third Restatement
project).
5. The third volume's subtitle alone, General Principles, suggests the
markedly different approach the ALI took toward this most recent torts
Restatement project. The First and Second Restatements consisted each of
four volumes, finished respectively in 1939 and 1979. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS (1979); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1939); see also
Lance Liebman, Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES), at xiii-xv (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001)
[hereinafter FIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT FOREWORD].
"Work on the Third
Restatement," ALI Director Lance Liebman noted in the foreword to the 2001
Tentative Draft, "proceeded in a different fashion" from that of the previous
Restatements. Id. at xiii. "Rather than proceeding directly to work on a
single, comprehensive new Torts Restatement, the Institute first undertook to
'restate' two sub-areas of the field of torts: Products Liability and
Apportionment of Liability." Id.; see also Harvey S. Perlman & Gary T.
Schwartz, General Principles, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 8, 9-10 (2000)
(describing the developments from the First Restatement to the Third
Restatement project).
According to Liebman, these two areas were in
particular need of restatement and clarification because, "Products Liability
had grown exponentially in magnitude as a legal subject," and Apportionment
was "essentially a new topic, resulting from the death of contributory
negligence." FIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT FOREWORD, supra, at xiii. The Products
Liability and Apportionment projects were completed in 1998 and 2000,
respectively. Id.
6. For example, the first volumes of the First and Second Restatements
are devoted entirely to intentional torts, and the second volumes are dedicated
to a restatement of negligence principles. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (1979); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1939). Professor Schwartz,
expressing his "less is more" philosophy, see infra note 7, described the First
Restatement, presumably pejoratively, as a "fat, four-volume effort." Perlman
& Schwartz, supra note 5, at 8.
7. FIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT FOREWORD, supra note 5, at xiii. Professor
Schwartz described the rationale for the different path taken by the Third
Restatement. "If it took twenty years to do the Restatement (Second), given
the enormous expansion in the case law, and given the enormous new range of
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was, however, the volume's treatment of duty that would prove
8
most controversial.
Duty has traditionally played a prominent role in
negligence doctrine.9 First year law students are taught almost
universally that negligence consists of four distinct elements:
duty, breach, causation, and harm.'0 To establish a prima facie
controversies that now surround tort law," Professor Schwartz argued, "it
would take fifty years to revise the Restatement (Second) in its four-volume
totality." Perlman & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 9. "[Tlhere ha[d] never been
any thought," he contended, "of completely redoing the second Restatement in
four volumes from start to finish." Id. He suggested that such a project would
be useless upon arrival. Id.
8. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing the
controversial treatment of the duty concept). Put simply, Schwartz proposed
removing duty as an affirmative element of negligence, and replacing it with
duty's obverse. See DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, §§ 3-4, 6. According to
the Discussion Draft, judges, as a matter of policy or principle, could relieve
defendants of liability for otherwise negligent acts upon a judicial
determination that the defendant owed "no-duty" to the plaintiff. See
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, §§ 3, 6; see also infra notes 50-57 and
accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 21-29 and accompanying text (discussing duty as an
element of negligence).
10. A survey of numerous prominent torts casebooks reinforces the
pedagogical prominence of the four-element tort of negligence. See, e.g.,
GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 108-09 (1983) (citing
the four elements); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 128
(5th ed. 1990) (reciting "duty, breach, causation, and damages" as the
elements of a "standard negligence action"); JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 221-22 (3d ed. 2001) (describing an
actor's "basic obligations" and citing the four elements from section 281 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts); JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND
SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 131 (9th ed. 1994) (same). A
number of modern textbooks cite a five-element negligence rule. See, e.g., DAN
B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 93 (3d ed. 1997);
MARK F. GRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 213-468, 555-784, 851-98
(1994) (dedicating Chapter Four to Duty, Chapter Five to Breach of Duty,
Chapter Seven to Cause-in-Fact, Chapter Eight to Proximate Cause, and
Chapter Ten to Actual Damages); JOSEPH W. LITTLE & LYRISSA BARNEPT
LIDSLEY, TORTS: THE CIVIL LAW OF REPARATION FOR HARM DONE BY
WRONGFUL ACT 35-95 (2d ed. 1997) (devoting sections 4.02-06 to Duty, Breach,
Cause-in-Fact,Proximate Causation and Damages, respectively); DAVID W.
ROBERTSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 83-94 (2d ed. 1998) (subdividing
the causation element into two distinct elements, factual cause, or "cause-infact," and proximate cause). Since all authors acknowledge duty as an
element, the difference between the four-element characterization and the
five-element characterization of the tort of negligence is, for this Note's
purpose, doctrinally immaterial. Professors Dobbs and Hayden, for example,
note that
[d]ifferent courts may state these [five] required elements in slightly
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case of negligently inflicted harm, plaintiffs must offer evidence
sufficient to allow a jury to find the existence of all four of these
elements." Though in the most standard cases the duty
analysis may not require rigorous attention, acknowledging
that the duty inquiry may often be routine is not to argue that
duty is not actually a prima facie element of an action in
negligence.
In 2000, Vanderbilt University Law School devoted its
John W. Wade Conference to a discussion of the 1999 General

different ways, but the differences are matters of style, not of
substance. All courts require the plaintiff to sustain the burden of
proving each of these five elements. All courts also agree that if the
plaintiff fails to meet the burden of proving any one of them, the
plaintiff cannot recover.
DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra, at 93. The second Tentative Draft also subdivides
causation and seems to embrace a five-element negligence rule, SECOND
TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 1, § 6 cmt. b, but as discussed later in this Note,
any doctrinal similarity the second Tentative Draft bears to formulations such
as Dobbs's and Hayden's is merely superficial. See infra notes 147-53.
A smaller number of casebooks only dedicate discussion to three elements.
See, e.g., CHARLES 0. GREGORY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 101,
247, 325 (3d ed. 1977) (dividing its discussion of negligence in Chapter Four,
The Negligence Issue, Chapter Five, Causation,and Chapter Six, The Duty of
the Case); see also MARK A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 29-340 (7th ed. 2001) (titling the four
negligence chapters The Negligence Principle,The Duty Requirement: Physical
Injuries, The Duty Requirement: Non-Physical Harm, and Causation).
Although the Gregory casebook bears some initial resemblance to the Franklin
and Rabin casebook, this resemblance is cursory. Gregory's chapter on
negligence discusses the negligence element of the tort of negligence-in other
words, breach. See GREGORY, supra, 101-246. By contrast, upon closer
inspection, the Franklin and Rabin casebook tracks the five-element
negligence school. Chapter three, The Duty Requirement: Physical Injuries, is
the true "duty" chapter, highlighted by its concern for "obligations." See
FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra, at 130-260. The authors characterize the fourth
chapter, titled The Duty Requirement: Non-Physical Harm, as a discussion of
"types of harm." Id. at 281. Finally, the fifth chapter is subdivided into two
parts: Part A, devoted to "cause in fact," and Part B, devoted to "[p]roximate
cause." See id. at 391-434; cf. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 3 (proposing
a three-element tort comprised of breach, causation, and harm); TENTATIVE
DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 1, § 6 cmt. b (proposing a five-element tort that
comports generally with the traditional formulation but separates the
causation into two sub-elements: factual cause and proximate cause).
11. See, e.g., CHRISTIE, supra note 10, at 108-09; cf 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE
LAW OF TORTS 269-73 (2001) (applying this procedural requirement to the five
elements: duty, breach, factual cause, proximate cause, and harm); 2 STUART
M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 9:3, at 1006-07 (1985)
(noting the Second Restatement's inclusion of "legal cause" as an element of
negligence but requiring, nonetheless, proof sufficient to establish only three
elements of a cause of action in negligence: duty, breach, and harm).
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Principles Discussion Draft.' 2 The conferees-most notably
Professors John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky, the coauthors of the Conference's main paper-took particular aim at
the ALI's dismissal of duty as an affirmative and co-equal
element of negligence. 13
Goldberg and Zipursky argued
vigorously for the maintenance of duty as a key component of
negligence law and for the reinstatement of duty to its proper
place in the Third Restatement's negligence doctrine.14 After
all, they complained, "it is the promise of a relatively clear,
unified, and comprehensive account of negligence that
5
undergirds the project of restating the law."
The Wade Conference helped to break the duty issue wide
open. In March of 2001, the ALI released the first Tentative
Draft of the final volume of the Third Restatement, now
retitled Liability for Physical Harm (Basic Principles).16 The
12. See John C. P. Golbderg, Introduction to The Restatement (Third) of
Torts: General Principlesand the John W. Wade Conference, 54 VAND. L. REV.
639, 639-40 (2001). The Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy also devoted
its 2000 symposium to the General Principles Discussion Draft. See Harvey S.
Perlman, The Restatement Process, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 2, 2-7 (2000).
13. See generally Goldberg, supra note 12, at 639, 641-43; Goldberg &
Zipursky, supra note 1 at 723-36.
14. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 724-32. Implicit in
Goldberg and Zipursky's criticisms is the tension between passive restatement
and progressive legal reform inherent in Restatement projects. Professor
Schwartz briefly addressed this tension when he described the ALI's response
to the recent "modern tort crisis." See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying
text. "The American Law Institute [first] addressed that 'torts crisis' by
commissioning a project in the late 1980s that was not a Restatement at all,
but rather a broad-ranging effort to kind of reform or recommend revised
criteria for not only tort liability rules, but tort practices more generally."
Perlman & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 8. When the volume was published in
1991, it "basically was dead on arrival"; Schwartz conceded that "the study
was kind of a fiasco, an effort to engage in a certain kind of major law reform
which did not produce any result that the ALI was willing to support." Id. at
9. Subsequently, "the ALI turned back to more traditional Restatement
projects." Id.
15. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 664.
16.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM

(BASIC PRINCIPLES) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) [hereinafter TENTATIVE
DRAFT NO. 1]; see also FIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT FOREWORD, supra note 5, at

xiii (stating that the Third Restatement project was formerly titled Torts:
General Principals). According to the foreword that accompanies the first
Tentative Draft, Michael Green, who had previously served as co-Reporter for
the now completed Apportionment project, joined Professor Schwartz as coReporter for the Basic Principles volume. Id. at xiv. While Professor Green
assumed primary responsibility for the treatment of causation, he also
collaborated with Professor Schwartz on "affirmative duties." Id. Sadly,
Professor Schwartz took ill shortly before the ALI's 2001 annual meeting and
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ALI renamed the draft in order to "convey more accurately [the
volume's] intended scope." 17 The director of the ALI, Lance
Liebman, explicitly acknowledged the controversy surrounding
the Discussion Draft's treatment of duty, noting that "the
project has benefited from the discussion and even from the
18
disagreement that it has engendered."
Whether it is possible to discern this benefit remains to be
seen. At the May 2001 annual meeting, the ALI approved the
first Tentative Draft in its entirety-except for its two duty
provisions, which the members remanded to the Reporters for
further revision.1 9 That remand produced a second Tentative
Draft, released in March of 2002.20
In the wake of this controversy, this Note has one central
goal: to evaluate the adequacy of the ALI's evolving account of
negligence and duty. Relying on the critical framework
provided by Goldberg and Zipursky, this Note examines the
2001 and 2002 Tentative Drafts in an attempt to discern
whether subsequent ALI responses provide a convincing
argument for the exclusion of duty as an element of negligence.
Part I summarizes the history of duty's place in negligence

died on July 25, 2001. Lance Liebman, Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES), at i, xiii (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2002) [hereinafter SECOND TENTATIVE DRAFT FOREWORD];
Introductory Note to TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, at xxv. Professor
Green presented and defended Professor Schwartz's work at the 2001 meeting,
with the help of ALI Council member Kenneth Abraham. SECOND TENTATIVE
DRAFT FOREWORD, supra, at xiii. Professor Green has since been joined on the
Third Restatement project by co-Reporter William Powers, Jr. Id.
17. FIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT FOREWORD, supra note 5, at xiii.
18. Id. at xiv-xv. At least for the purposes of the first Tentative Draft, the
disagreement proved to be too much. See infra note 19 and accompanying text
(describing the ALI's decision to reconsider Schwartz's controversial duty
provisions).
19. Introductory Note to TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 1, at xxv.
The foreword to the second Tentative Draft does not acknowledge that the ALI
considered Schwartz's treatment of duty controversial. See ALI, Actions
Taken
on 2001 Annual Meeting Drafts, at http://www.ali.org/ali/
ALI2001_ActionsTKN.htm (last visited August 26, 2002) ("Tentative Draft No.
1 of the Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Basic
Principles), was tentatively approved, except for §§ 6 and 7 [relating to duty],
which were recommitted to the Reporters for revision."); THE ALI REPORTER,
Torts Reporter Gary Schwartz is Dead at 61, Summer 2001, at
http://www.ali.org/ali/-R2304_Schwartz.htm (last visited August 26, 2002)
("The [Tentative] draft ... was acclaimed. . . , and except for the need for
further consideration of its controversial treatment of duty, approved by the
membership.").
20. See TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 1, at i.
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law, paying particular attention to the development of duty's
role in the previous Restatement projects. Part II fleshes out,
in greater detail, Goldberg and Zipursky's stance in favor of the
centrality of duty in negligence law. Part III chronologues the
ALI's response to those criticisms of its negligence and duty
provisions. Despite the ALI's frequent lip service to accommodate Goldberg and Zipursky's concerns, this Part exposes
the ALI's persistent efforts to deny duty its rightful (and
doctrinally proper) place as a key, stand-alone element of the
tort of negligence.
I. DUTY, NEGLIGENCE, AND THE RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS
A. THE FIRST AND SECOND RESTATEMENT APPROACH TO THE
ROLE OF DUTY

The conception that American negligence law includes a
positive duty element predates the First Restatement of
Torts. 2' Furthermore, as recently as 1984, Professors Prosser
21. See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE ELEMENTS OF TORTS 263 (Chicago,
Callaghan & Co. 1895) ("[N]egligence, in a legal sense, is but the failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of anotherperson that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury." (emphasis added)). Other authorities speak
more cryptically of the duty element. See, e.g., MELVILLE MADISON BIGELOW,
THE LAW OF TORTS 106 (8th ed. 1907) (observing that a negligent defendant
"owed a duty to the plaintiff not to be negligent" (emphasis in original)); 1
FRANcIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS 124 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1859)
(describing negligence as "the omitting to do something that a reasonable man
would do, or the doing something that a reasonable man would not do").
Neither Bigelow nor Hilliard seemed to speak explicitly of duty as a discrete
and positive obligation (or at least not all of the time). Bigelow, for example,
notes that "[i]n many cases the duty will be obvious on the general facts, and
hence will not call for special consideration; in other cases it will not be
obvious that there was a duty, or what the nature of the duty was. Such cases
will call for examination of the question." BIGELOW, supra, at 107. When
Bigelow later offered a "definition" of negligence, however, he stated that
negligence "consists in failure in the particular place or situation to conform to
the conduct of a prudent, careful, skillful, or diligent man often called the
average man; which failure, if it cause [sic] damage, is a breach of duty." Id.
at 110. Bigelow, then, spoke not of a general duty to exercise reasonable care
(or a general duty not to be negligent), but a specific duty rooted in a
"particular place or situation" and, presumably, to a particular person so
situated. Id. An actor's duty arises out of peculiarities, not generalities.
Likewise, Hilliard, in a general discussion of torts that preceded his discussion
of negligence, focused conspicuously on the concept of a positive duty, referring
to "an invasion of some legal right"; questioning whether an actor "was under

240

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:233

and Keeton recited the "traditional formula" for negligence that
included as the first element "a duty or obligation, recognized
by the law, requiring the person to conform to a certain
standard of conduct, for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks."2 2
The First Restatement codified the four elements of
negligence: duty, breach, causation, and harm. 23 The First
Restatement held an actor "liable for an invasion of an interest
of another, if . . . the interest invaded is protected against
unintentional invasion." 24 The Reporter notes, "This Clause
states the requirement that the interest which is invaded must
be one which is protected, not only against acts intended to
invade it, but also against unintentional invasions. 2 5 That is,
the protected interest must be protected specifically against
negligence. Other sections of the First Restatement confirm
the First Restatement's commitment to the role of affirmative
duty. Section 284 defines negligent conduct as either "an act
which the actor as a reasonable man should realize as involving
an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of
another, or... a failure to do an act which is necessary for the
protection or assistance of another and which the actor is under
a duty to do. 2 6 Section 281 does not purport to resolve which
interests might be protected and which might not. 27 This
language of the First Restatement went unchanged between
the Tentative Draft No. 4 in 1929 and the final published

version in

1939.28

When the Reporters of the Second Restatement revisited
the general negligence provisions of the First Restatement
several decades later, they elected to make no changes to either
a legal obligation"; and insisting elsewhere that a complaint "allege the duty
specifically." 1 HILLIARD, supra, at 119-23.
22.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 30, at 164 (5th ed. 1984); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 175 (1941). It should be noted that this authority was
published at the height of Professor Schwartz's alleged "modern tort crisis."
See supra note 14; infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (describing
Shwartz's alleged "tort crisis").
23. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 281 (1939) (laying out the four
elements in the First Restatement).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 281 cmt. b.
26. Id. § 284 (emphasis added).
27. See id. § 281.
28. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 281 (1939), with
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 165 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1929).
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the wording of the duty element or the language of the
comment which accompanied that element. 29 The Reporters
did, however, take issue with the First Restatement's
treatment of breach. 30 The breach element of the First
Restatement required that "the conduct of the actor [be]
negligent with respect to such [invaded] interest or any other
similar interest of the other which is protected against
unintentional invasion." 3 1 The Second Restatement required,
instead, that the conduct of the actor be "negligent with respect
to the other, or a class of persons within which he is
32
included."
B. THE RESTATEMENT PHILOSOPHY AND THE SHIFT FROM
DESCRIPTION TO PRESCRIPTION

One of the thrusts of Goldberg and Zipursky's criticism of
the Third Restatement Discussion Draft is its failure to
accurately reflect actual legal practice. 33 This tension is merely
a theme of this Note, and not its topic. It bears mentioning,
however, that even the historical context in which this debate
takes place is an object of dispute. Professor Schwartz has
justified his doctrinal departure on, among other things, the
grounds that the modern era of tort doctrine faces unique
challenges. The Second Restatement, Schwartz suggested, was

29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 & cmt. b (1979).
30. According to the Second Restatement Reporters, this breach provision
reflected a distinction, explicitly acknowledged in comment g of section 281 of
the First Restatement, "that conduct which is negligent because it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to one interest of the plaintiff, such as his property,
does not make the defendant liable when it results in harm to another interest
of the plaintiff, such as his person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281,
note to institute at 1 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1959); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 281 cmt. g (1939). The language of the old clause (b) reflected dictum
in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) that
allegedly negligent conduct must be negligent "with respect to the particular
interest of the plaintiff which has in fact been invaded." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS questions on Tentative Draft No. 4 at ix (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1959). The Reporter insisted that this position is no longer "even
dictum," having been thoroughly repudiated by case law. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 281, note to institute at 1 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1959).
31. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 281(b) (1939).

32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1979).
But cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1959)
(requiring merely that "the conduct of the actor [be] negligent with respect to
the other" (emphasis omitted)).
33. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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the product of an era of consensus in tort law. 34 Schwartz
argued that, by contrast, tort law has been "in crisis" 35 since
the mid-1970s.
Those who chronicled the first two Restatement projects
The Introduction to the First
paint a different picture.
Restatement describes the First Restatement's commencement
in an era of significant legal change and uncertainty. 36 William
Draper Lewis, the Director of the ALI at the time of the First
Restatement's publication, went as far as to say that the goal of
the First Restatement, to inject certainty and clarity into an
increasingly uncertain area of American law, "is accomplished
in so far as the legal profession accepts the Restatement as
prima facie a correct statement of the general law of the United
States."37 The First Restatement's clear purpose was to stem
the tide of that uncertainty; the First Restatement seems from
the beginning to have been conceived as a functional, or
38
positivist, work.
The Second Restatement also highlighted these twin
themes: functionality in the face of uncertainty. The Second
Restatement was, once again, a rock in a sea of change. The
"enormous change in torts" that preceded the promulgation of
the Second Restatement reflected "new conceptions of the social
function of this branch of law ...; the scope of change wrought
by the courts may, indeed, have transcended that in any other
field." 39 Herbert Wechsler, then ALI Director, also reiterated
the Restatement's functional approach; he described the "prime
objective" of the Second Restatement as a revision of "[First]
Restatement formulations in the light of changes in the course

34.

See Perlman & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 8-9.

35. Id.
36.

Factors such as an

ever increasing volume of the decisions of the courts, establishing new
rules or precedents, and the numerous instances in which the
decisions are irreconcilable, taken in connection with the growing
complication of economic and other conditions of modern life, [were]
rapidly increasing the law's uncertainty and lack of clarity.., and...
will force the abandonment of our common-law system ...unless a
new factor promoting certainty and clarity can be found.
William Draper Lewis, Introduction to RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, at ix

(1939).
37. Id.
38.

See supra notes 36-37.

39.

Herbert Wechsler, Introduction to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,

at ix (1965).
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of the decisions. "40 Wechsler, however, was quick to note that
reflecting change was not the sole purpose of the ALI's revision:
"The object also is to detect any errors that were made, to
clarify where statement was unclear, to take account of
criticism of analysis or of articulation expressed in the
literature through the years."4' The Second Restatement, then,
sought both to account for changes in tort law generally since
the publication of the First Restatement and also to correct
errors inherent in the First Restatement itself. Wechsler's
comments also allude to the relevance of a new source of
information about American tort law-academic scholarshipnot explicitly acknowledged by or incorporated into the First
Restatement. Wechsler described
the Second Restatement as
"a fully reconsidered text."42
Wechsler's Introduction to the Second Restatement,
however, also acknowledged a new purpose of the Restatement
project: normative prescription in addition to positivist
description. Wechsler posited that since the publication of the
First Restatement, it "has been a vital force in shaping the law
of torts, as it has developed in the courts and has been taught
to a full generation [of students] in the schools." 43 The Second
Restatement also introduced a new format "which call[ed] for
more expansive commentary, giving fuller statement of the
reasons for positions taken, commentary no less 44carefully
examined . . . than the black letter rules themselves."
C. THE THIRD RESTATEMENT DISCUSSION DRAFT:
RE-ENVISIONING NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE
The Foreword to the Third Restatement's 1999 Discussion
Draft reflected the tension between the ALI's descriptive and
prescriptive methodologies. 45 Both the nature of the Third
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at vii (emphasis added).
44. Id.
45. With the Third Restatement, the ALI once again confronted
uncertainty and obfuscation in American tort law. See supra notes 14, 34-35
and accompanying text (describing the "crisis" facing modern tort law); see
also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forewordto DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, at
xi (1999) (noting there are "thousands of judicial decisions addressing one or
another of these basic tort ideas, and literally hundreds of law-review articles
and commentaries in the academic literature").
The foreword to the
Discussion Draft seems to give equal time to the concerns of professionals and
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Restatement generally, and the approach of the third volume
specifically, however, have represented a departure from the
previous Restatements' comprehensiveness. 46 In contrast to
the Second Restatement's broad-brush approach, Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., the ALI Director who presided over the submission
of the 1999 Discussion Draft, described the drafting approach of
the Third Restatement as "selection by exclusion." 47
Indeed, the approach of the 1999 Discussion Draft struck
some commentators as a drastic and unnecessary departure,
and many were concerned with the Draft's reformulation of
negligence doctrine. 48
For instance, while the previous
Restatements described negligence by enumerating its
traditional four elements, 49 the Discussion Draft described
negligence liability by stating, "An actor is subject to liability
for negligent conduct that is a legal cause of physical harm."50
The Discussion Draft further departs from the First and Second
Restatements by describing a negligent actor merely as one
who "does not exercise reasonable care under all the
circumstances." 51
the concerns of academics. "The formulations," 1999 ALI Director Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., suggested, "are subject to nuances of meaning and subtleties of
interpretation." Id. Some of these formulations, Hazard admitted "may be
inconsequential to a legal linguist" even though they are "perceived in the
minds of practitioners as making [a] significant difference." Id. Ignoring the
concerns of legal academics in favor of matters of concern to those who use the
law seems remarkably consistent with the spirit of the previous Restatements.
Nevertheless, Hazard assured readers that the Discussion Draft devotes time
to "formulations that seem innocuous to the professional legal mind" though
they are "held by some academics to implicate fundamental issues in tort-law
theory." Id. These latter issues can only be of concern to a Restatement that
is prescriptively minded.
46. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
47. Hazard, supra note 45, at xi.
48. See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 663; Patrick J. Kelley,
Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive
Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1047-56 (2000); David
Owen, Duty Rules, 54 VAND. L. REV 767, 782-85 (2001); Robert L. Rabin, The
Duty Concept in Negligence Law: A Comment, 54 VAND. L. REV. 787, 790-98
(2001).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1979); RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 281 (1939). But cf. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6,
Reporter's Note cmt. a (asserting that the Second Restatement's definition of
negligence "does not include any explicit duty element").
50. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 3.
51. Id. § 4; cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 282 (1939) (defining
negligence as "conduct ...which falls below the standard established by law
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1979) (employing identical
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The most controversial provision in the Discussion Draft
concerned the treatment of the duty element in negligence
law. 52 Section 6 of the Discussion Draft laid out the role (or

rather, non-role) of duty in negligence liability. 53 Rather than
portraying duty as a positive (or affirmative) requisite of tort
liability, the Discussion Draft states that an individual is liable
for the harm caused by her negligent conduct (as defined in
sections 3 and 4)54 unless the court makes a finding of "no-duty"
based on considerations of policy or principle. 55 In the
accompanying comments, Professor Schwartz defended this
unusual conception of the role of duty. 56 In the easy cases,
57
Schwartz asserted, "duty is in truth a nonissue."
language). Though the First and Second Restatements do not acknowledge a
positive duty obligation explicitly in their section 282 definitions of negligence,

an actor's conduct is still measured against a legally established standard
rather than a vague reference to "all the circumstances." See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(a) (1979); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 281(a)
(1939).
52. See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 658-63 (asserting
that preliminary drafts of the Third Restatement characterized the law in a
manner that departed from standard usage); see also supra note 19 (describing
the ALI's recognition of the controversial nature of the Discussion Draft's
treatment of duty).
53. See DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6. The text reads in full,
Even if the defendant's negligent conduct is the legal cause of the
plaintiffs physical harm, the plaintiff is not liable for that harm if the
court determines that the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff.
Findings of no duty are unusual, and are based on judicial recognition
of special problems of principles or policy that justify the withholding
of liability.
Id.
54. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 53.
56. See generally DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6 cmts. a-c, h.
57. Id. § 6 cmt. a. Schwartz contended that "the recognition of a general
duty to avoid negligence replaces the view often associated with 19th Century
tort law, to the effect that only particular relationships between parties give
rise to a negligence liability obligation." Id. Schwartz further stated that
[wihile courts frequently say that establishing a "duty" is the first
prerequisite in an individual tort case, courts commonly go on to say
that there is a "general duty" to "exercise reasonable care," to avoid
subjecting others to an "unreasonable risk of harm," or to comply with
the "legal standard of reasonable conduct." Though cast in the
language of duty, these formulations merely give expression to the
point that negligence is the standard of liability. This point, however,
is a basic and general tort principle (see § 3), which absent unusual
circumstances does not require restatement on a case-by-case basis.
Id. Schwartz's position comports with Bigelow's assertion that in most cases
the determination of a duty will be uncontroversial, and only in the cases
where the duty issue will "not be obvious" will an "examination of the
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II. GOLDBERG AND ZIPURSKY: REINSTATING DUTY
In 2000, Goldberg and Zipursky authored the Vanderbilt
Law School's centerpiece symposium article on the Third
Restatement General Principles volume. 58
Their article
challenged the removal of duty as an element of negligence and
' 59
its redefinition as "absence of an exemption from liability.
Their criticism takes two approaches: structural and doctrinal.
First, Goldberg and Zipursky criticize Schwartz's structural
effort to limit duty's scope. 60 Second, in a doctrinal critique, the
authors maintain that duty plays an important role in
negligence cases. 6 1 They argue that the Restatement project
should clarify duty's doctrinal significance despite the element's
62
arguable indeterminacy.
A. STRUCTURAL CRITIQUE
Goldberg and Zipursky first denounce Schwartz's limited
scope for the negligence provision. In parallel fashion to the
minimalist approach of this third volume of the Third
Restatement, 63 Schwartz limited the application of his
negligence provisions only to physical harm, "includ[ing]

question" be required. See BIGELOW, supra note 21, at 107.
Schwartz has acknowledged that there are "unusual cases" in which,
despite the satisfaction of the requirements of negligence, legal causation, and
physical harm, the imposition of liability is problematic for reasons of principle
or policy. In these cases, "judicial consideration in terms of the doctrine of
duty is appropriate." DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6 cmt. c. This
consideration of duty in an explicitly "negative" fashion departs from Bigelow.
See BIGELOW, supra note 21, at 110.
58. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 657.
59. Id. at 684.
60. See infra Part II.A.
61. See infra Part II.B.
62. The description of Goldberg and Zipursky's structuralist critique is
intended to introduce their critical paradigm. Goldberg and Zipursky are
primarily concerned with challenging Schwartz's negligence and duty
provisions facially-as inadequate regardless of whatever limitations are
placed on the scope of the draft. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 678
("Inclusion of a meaningful conception of duty is necessary even assuming the
[scope of the] project specified in the Reporter's Note."). To that extent, the
facial challenge to the Restatement project's negligence and duty provisions is
this Note's concern as well.
63. Lance Liebman, the current ALI Director, noted in the foreword to the
first Tentative Draft that the third volume had been renamed Liability for
Physical Harm "in order to convey more accurately its intended scope." FIRST
TENTATIVE DRAFT FOREWORD, supra note 5, at xiii.
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personal injury and property damage."64 Schwartz specifically
exempted "economic losses or emotional distress that are not
the consequences of physical harm. ' 65 Goldberg and Zipursky
assert that this emasculated negligence provision unjustifiably
"runs counter to the ordinary usage that it is meant to
explicate." 66 More importantly, the assertion that collisions
between strangers (as a prototype of negligence actions for
physical harm) form the "core" of modern negligence (or,
alternatively, that these interactions are what modern
negligence law is "all about") is, at best, a "historical or
empirical claim." 67 A restatement of negligence, the authors
argue, should not be a "history of negligence" but instead
should be "a document that purports to lay bare the elements of
negligence as it is defined by the courts." 68 Treating collision
cases as the "core" of negligence law wrongly suggests that they
embody "some sort of analytic primacy in the explication of
negligence, [or] that they reveal negligence stripped down to its
elements." 69 Goldberg and Zipursky argue that courts apply
the traditional four elements of negligence to these cases as
they do all others.70
To take the matter further, while
Schwartz may be correct that the duty element is more
germane to those negligence topics he seeks to exclude from his
account of negligence, 71 his exclusion of those negligence topics
64. DiscusSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 3 cmt. a. Goldberg and Zipursky
insist that "there are several areas of negligence law that his model fits
poorly." Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 674.
65. DiSCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 3 cmt. a.
66. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 675. It is in this sense that
their criticism is structural rather than strictly doctrinal; Goldberg and
Zipursky challenge not only the formulation of the negligence provision but
the purpose that the negligence provision purports to serve. Id. at 677.
67. Id. at 676.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 676-77.
70. See id. at 677. Courts "treat [collision] cases as instantiations of the
four-element tort of negligence with no greater or lesser significance than any
other instantiations of negligence, including cases of malpractice, landowner
liability, and affirmative duties." Id. These latter causes of action are all
negligence torts arguably excluded by Schwartz's note on the scope of
negligence.
71. Conversely, a three-element negligence provision may be a more
doctrinally sound description of those negligence topics included in his limited
scope. Perhaps a three-element provision is a better description of physical
injury claims than it is of thornier claims like duty-to-warn or emotional
distress. It would be logically flawed, however, to argue by extension that the
three-element provision is thereby inherently superior.
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that do not correspond to a three-element account from his
version of the Restatement is not an intellectually honest way
72
to argue that negligence embodies a three-element tort.
B. DOCTRINAL CRITIQUE
More importantly, Goldberg and Zipursky argue that even
if one were to accept Schwartz's limited account of the
Restatement project, it is still necessary to include a
meaningful conception of duty.7 3 Goldberg and Zipursky
challenge Schwartz's contention that duty is a nonissue in
straightforward, collision-type negligence cases.7 4 There are
categories of negligence cases, they argue, that cannot be
"captured" without a concept of duty in its affirmative,
obligation sense.7 5 Duty, they claim, represents a necessary
element to restate even "traditional" accidental physical injury
cases. 76 Goldberg and Zipursky offer several examples of
"courts wrestling with duty-as-an-element within the ambit of
[the Discussion Draft's] Section 3"77 negligence liability
provision as emblematic of duty's key role in physical injury
negligence cases.78
72. Goldberg and Zipursky question Schwartz's "decision to avoid duty so
far as possible, and to exclude areas that make duty-avoidance impossible."
Id. at 730. Put another way, "because of [Schwartz's] unduly narrow account
of the legal core of negligence, [he] is compelled to write off huge chunks of tort
law as being outside the arena of'general principles' and outside the law." Id.
at 731.
73. Id. at 678.
74. See id.
75. See id. Goldberg and Zipursky highlight two such categories: "duty to
warn" and "duty not to increase the risk of plaintiff suffering harm by a third
party tortfeasor." Id.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. See id. For example, the plaintiff in Mussivand v. David acquired a
sexually transmitted disease, indirectly, from his spouse's lover. 544 N.E.2d
267, 265 (Ohio 1989). The question was not whether the defendant owed a
duty of care to protect his lover from acquiring the disease, but whether the
defendant's duty of care extended to the lover's spouse. Id. at 270. The Ohio
Supreme Court held that the defendant did owe a duty to the plaintiff to
disclose his condition. See id. at 273; see also Hopping v. College Block
Partners, 599 N.W.2d 703, 705-06 (Iowa 1999) (discussing whether the owner
of a building and the restaurant business located within the building had a
duty to remove accumulations of ice and snow as a result of their having been
notified and having had an opportunity to remove the condition); Parmely v.
Hildebrand, 603 N.W.2d 713, 717-18 (S.D. 1999) (discussing the extent to
which the seller of a house owed a duty of care to a purchaser regarding the
disclosure of defects in the house). Goldberg and Zipursky emphasized that in
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C. WILL THE REAL DUTY PLEASE STAND UP?: ADDRESSING

DUTY'S INDETERMINACY

Goldberg and Zipursky also addressed the argument that
duty should be disregarded because of its indeterminacy.
Professor Harvey Perlman, who drafted alternative negligence
provisions for the General Principles volume, 79 has argued
vehemently for duty's demise. 80 The thrust of Perlman's
Mussivand, "The court did not hold that the duty was owed generally to the
public, but only to foreseeable plaintiffs such as known spouses." Goldberg &
Zipursky, supra note 1, at 679. In the court's words, "We do not.., mean to
say that [the defendant], subsequent to his affair with [the plaintiffs] wife,
[would] be liable to any and all persons with whom [the wife] may have sexual
contact." Mussivand, 544 N.E.2d at 273. Furthermore, "the liability of a
person with a sexually transmissible disease to a third person, such as a
spouse, would be extinguished as soon as the paramour spouse knew or should
have known that he or she was exposed to or had contracted a venereal
disease." Id. In sum, the defendant's duty was limited both with respect to
the question of to whom the duty extended and with respect to how long the
duty lasted before it expired. The Ohio Supreme Court's formulation is quite
distinct from the more general duty Schwartz espouses.
79. Professor Perlman served as one of the Reporters for the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: General Principles. See Goldberg, supra note 13, at 640.
Professors Perlman and Schwartz both drafted negligence provisions for
consideration for the General Principles volume of the Third Restatement of
Torts. Id. Even as of the time of the Wade Conference at Vanderbilt, see
supra note 14, both sets of negligence provisions were under consideration for
inclusion in the Third Restatement. Id. Professor Goldberg observed,
however, that as the Wade Conference submissions went to press, "it
appear[ed] that Professor Schwartz's provisions [would] provide the focus for
ALI discussions in the immediate future." Goldberg, supra note 13, at 640.
Professor Perlman and Schwartz co-hosted the Kansas Law School
Symposium on the Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles. See
Perlman & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 8.
80. See Perlman & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 15. Perlman argued for a
"consistency of language that will allow us to speak to each other so the courts
of Florida and the courts of Texas do not have wholly different views about
what 'duty' means." Id. Strangely, Perlman can be read as endorsing a
traditional approach to negligence; his provisions purported to outline the
basic elements of any tort case, whether an intentional tort, negligence, or
strict liability, as "the nature and the scope of the defendant's legal obligation,
the breach, cause in fact, scope of liability, and legally recognizable harm." Id.
Perlman, however, clearly objects to duty: "What I have done in this section,
and what I have done throughout the material that I have drafted, is to not
use the word 'duty' in any context, because I do not understand it." Id. He
then clarified his conception of "legal obligation" as a question of "the general
nature of the obligation." Id. at 16. Perlman was concerned with whether "the
obligation [is] based in negligence or in strict liability" and whether one has an
"an obligation to avoid intentional behavior." •Id. Perlman thus comes full
circle, if cryptically so, to join Schwartz in asking the basic question: Does the
defendant in this case have an obligation to avoid negligent behavior (or,
alternatively, is the conduct in question subject to liability only for intentional
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argument is that duty is syntactically imprecise and
indeterminate-if ten different jurisdictions mean ten different
things when they use the word "duty," the solution is to
81
dispense with duty.
Goldberg and Zipursky agree that "the concept of duty in
negligence contains traps and confusions for judges, lawyers,
and academics." 82 At the heart of the Restatement's purpose,
however, lie the efforts of judges, lawyers, and academics to
respond to these concerns with attempts at clarification of the
duty element. Goldberg and Zipursky insist that
[t]o make this observation [that the concept of duty contains traps
and confusions] is not to join sides with the Reporters to reinvent

negligence law without duty under the guise of restatement. It is
merely to concede the premise of the General Principles project: that
the law of negligence would benefit from a clarification of its basic

provisions. Duty is ineliminable in a restatement of negligence. Its
confusions should precipitate a more refined analysis that clarifies
83
the law of duty, rather than concealing or obfuscating it.

In response to this legal challenge, however, they clarify,
rather than dismiss, duty.
According to Goldberg and
Zipursky, duty possesses four distinct meanings, and the
challenge of the Restatement project is to separate the
"primary," affirmative, obligatory sense of duty from its
alternative meanings. 84 In addition to duty in its primary or
"obligation" sense, duty also functions as a "nexus
requirement," masquerades as "breach-as-a-matter-of-law,"
and, finally, operates as an "exemption from the operation of
negligence law," or "no-duty."8 5 Courts use duty in its "nexus"
form as a shorthand to describe the lack of a nexus between the
defendant's duty and the plaintiffs injury. 86 Put another way,
"the defendant's breach must be a breach of a duty owed to the
87
plaintiff," and not to some other person or group of persons.
The courts also invoke the language of duty "as a platform on
which it may stand in order to decide for itself the
unreasonableness or breach issue, and thus surreptitiously to

conduct)? Whatever the question means, it is not clear either what the answer
might be or how the answer might be helpful to practitioners.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 698.
Id.
See id. at 698-709.
See id. at 709-23.
See id. at 709.
Id.
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shrink the scope of the rule stating that the breach issue
ordinarily is for the jury."88 Finally, Goldberg and Zipursky
concede that courts speak of duty in the sense reflected in
section 6,89 or more accurately that courts speak of defendants
as having "no-duty."90 Goldberg and Zipursky insist, however,
that duty in its obligation sense is both functionally and
doctrinally distinct from, and does not "collapse" into, duty in
its exemption sense. 91 From this discussion emerges Goldberg
and Zipursky's central criticism: Regrettably, "[m]odern
scholars sometimes have assumed that the question, and the
notion of obligation as it exists in negligence, is trivial because
it is clearly satisfied in every case."92 Most importantly, the
fact that courts have used duty in its negative, exemption

88. Id. at 713.
89. See supra notes 53, 55 and accompanying text.
90. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 718.
91. See id. at 720-23. The Restatement Reporters have also acknowledged
some of duty's "alternative" forms. The Discussion Draft, for example,
acknowledged that duty serves as a placekeeper for "breach-as-a-matter-oflaw," albeit improperly. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6 Reporter's Note
cmt. a; see infra note 96 and accompanying text. The second Tentative Draft
further explained that
courts [may] take the question [of whether an actor exercised
reasonable care] away from the jury and determine that the party
was or was not negligent as a matter of law. Courts sometimes
express this result in terms of duty. Here, the rubric inaccurately
conveys the impression that the court's decision is separate from and
antecedent to the issues of negligence. In fact, these cases merely
reflect the one-sidedness of the fact bearing on negligence; they are
not properly treated as cases involving exemption from or
modification of the ordinary duty of reasonable care.
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. i.
92. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 705. The authors continue:
Prosser conveyed this idea when he said: "[uIn negligence cases, the
duty is always the same-to conform to the legal standard of
reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk." Others, most
famously Judge Andrews in dissent in Palsgraf,have made the point
by stating that there is a "duty to the world" to act reasonably.
Professor Schwartz offers his own version when he says that duty is
ordinarily a "non issue."
Id. (footnotes omitted). Goldberg and Zipursky are not the only authors to see
in Schwartz's negligence provisions the ascendancy of Andrews at the expense
of Cardozo. See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, The Passing of Palsgraf?, 54
VAND. L. REV. 803, 808-09 (2001) (asserting that the proposed Restatement's
conception of the duty element would threaten Cardozo's structured, two
inquiry analysis of duty by submerging the inquiry into an inquiry fashioned
according to general policy, thus lacking refined analysis).
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sense, 93 as Discussion Draft section 6 proposes courts should
necessity of duty in its
do, does not preclude the doctrinal
94
affirmative or obligation sense.
III. THE THIRD RESTATEMENT AND THE DEFENSE OF
"NO-DUTY"
Part III examines the Restatement project's development
This Part begins by
since the 1999 Discussion Draft.
summarizing the ground Schwartz covered in the original
Part III then discusses the work of
Discussion Draft.
Professors Schwartz and Michael Green in the 2001 first
Tentative Draft and the contributions of co-Reporters Green
and William Powers in the 2002 second Tentative Draft.
A. THE 1999 DISCUSSION DRAFT: LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR
THE DISMISSAL OF DUTY

In the Discussion Draft, Professor Schwartz acknowledged
that many courts require the establishment of "duty" as an
initial prerequisite for recovery in negligence. He clearly
considered this judicial language as pretextual. 95 Schwartz's
93. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. For Schwartz's
assertion that certain language used by courts is used to describe duty in its
exemption sense, see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
94. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 725. Goldberg & Zipursky
continue:
A restatement should recognize that... "no duty" pockets of the case
law exist, and that they have certain contours. But this does not
entail denying the existence of "duty" in the obligation sense or the
fact that the four-element test is the law. On the contrary, it permits
both.
Id. Goldberg and Zipursky reject the "false dichotomy between concepts of
obligation, on the one hand, and the practical concerns of law and policy, on
the other." Id. at 732. To embrace the dichotomy, as Schwartz has apparently
done, and to choose the latter over the former produces merely "a collection of
ad hoc policy decisions." Id. at 731.
95. See DIScUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6 cmt. a. Comment a states,
While courts frequently say that establishing "duty" is the first
prerequisite in an individual tort case, courts commonly go on to say
that there is a "general duty" to "exercise reasonable care" to avoid
subjecting others to "an unreasonable risk of harm, or to comply with
the "legal standard of reasonable conduct." Though cast in the
language of duty, these formulations merely give expression to the
point that negligence is the standard of liability. This point, however,
is a basic and general tort principle ... , which absent unusual
circumstances does not require restatement on a case-by-case basis.
Accordingly, in such cases, duty is in truth a nonissue. To be sure,
the recognition of a general duty to avoid negligence replaces the view
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relegation of duty to a nonissue recognized two subsets of cases
that require a distinct concept of duty as obligation: affirmative
97
96
duty cases (such as duty-to-rescue) and, unusual cases.
Schwartz's treatment of these "unusual cases" reveals that his
doctrinal departure is not merely of taxonomical and
organizational significance. These "unusual cases" concern the
heart of Schwartz's "no-duty" argument: "There are...
situations in which the requirements of negligence, legal
causation, and physical harm are or can be satisfied, but in
which, for reasons of principle or policy, the imposition of
For Schwartz, a
liability seems plainly troublesome."98
negligence plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
negligence by establishing breach, causation, and harm.99
According to Schwartz, judges on occasion deny liability for
reasons of mitigating policy. Under a traditional account of
negligence, a judge would deny liability by granting a defense
motion for failure to state a claim on grounds that the plaintiff
had failed to establish the duty element, and therefore had
failed to establish a prima facie case. 10 0
It is not immediately obvious that the category of cases
concerning affirmative duties and the category of "unusual
cases" (as Schwartz conceives of them) are actually distinct.
Judges have Schwartz's permission to explicitly consider the
duty element in both categories. Courts have traditionally
limited liability in duty-to-rescue cases by articulating a policy
that, as a general matter, actors have no duty to rescue
another.101 It appears that cases of affirmative duty (which the

often associated with 19th-century tort law, to the effect that only
particular relationships between the parties give rise to a negligence
liability obligation.
Id.
96. See id. § 6 cmt. b. The general rule of tort law "does not impose the
affirmative duty to rescue or to intervene." Id. Therefore, the role of duty (or
Schwartz's taxonomical preference for duty-to-rescue cases, "affirmative duty")
is relevant only "in cases considering the application of and exceptions to [this]
no affirmative duty rule." Id.
97. See id. § 6 cmt. c.
98. Id.

99. DiscussION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 3; see also text accompanying
supra note 50 (quoting the full text of section 3). But cf. TENTATiVE DRAFT
NO. 2, supra note 1, § 6 cmt. b (evincing, arguably, a different take on the
elements of a prima facie case for negligently inflicted harm).
100. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
101. See supra note 96.
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Discussion Draft purports to address) 10 2 are merely a subset of
the "unusual cases" (with which judges are encouraged to
dispense by principle or policy).
It is important to note that Schwartz has recognized both
the role of duty as obligation and its exemption partner, "noduty" 10 3 (though, from Goldberg and Zipursky's perspective, in
a way that inverted their respective doctrinal significance).
Schwartz also recognized that courts sometimes invoke duty as
04
a proxy for breach-as-a-matter-of-law. 1
Critically, Schwartz found support for his account of duty
in judicial statements. Judicial statements lend support both
to the proposition that duty is functionally a nonissue' 0 5 and to
the proposition that the duty a defendant owes a plaintiff, if
any, is a duty to avoid unreasonable conduct-a duty not to be

102. See DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, §§ 17-18.
103. For a brief discussion of Goldberg and Zipursky's four distinct
meanings of duty, see supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
104. See DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6 cmt. h (stating that courts
sometimes take the negligence issue away from the jury and express its
decision in terms of whether or not the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to
behave in a certain manner); TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. i
(stating the same proposition); supra note 91. Schwartz does not issue the
usual complaint that such declarations inappropriately usurp the role of the
jury in the determination of the breach question. Instead, Schwartz complains
that
these expressions [of breach-as-a-matter-of-law in the guise of no
duty] inaccurately convey the idea of a duty issue that is separate
from and antecedent to the negligence issue. In fact, these are merely
cases in which the one-sidedness of the evidence permits the court
itself to specify the content of the negligence standard.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6 cmt. h.
105. For an extensive (and largely critical) discussion of the role of duty in
American negligence law, see Fazzolari v. PortlandSchool DistrictNo. 1J, 734
P.2d 1326, 1327-32 (Or. 1987). The Fazzolaricourt concluded that
duty plays an affirmative role when an injured plaintiff invokes
obligations arising from a defendant's particular status or
relationships, or from legislation, beyond the generalized standards
that the common law of negligence imposes on persons at large. In
cases based solely on common-law negligence, "no-duty" is a defensive
argument asking a court to limit the reach of these generalized
standards as a matter of law. Duty remains a formal element of the
plaintiffs claim only in the sense that the plaintiff loses if the
defendant persuades a court to phrase such a limit in terms of "no
duty."
Id. at 1331-32 (emphasis added). For another case announcing that new
duties arise from special relationships or legislation, see Lauer v. City of New
York, 733 N.E.2d 184, 187, 189-90 (N.Y. 2000). See also Goldberg & Zipursky,
supra note 1, at 733-34 (discussing Lauer).
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06

negligent. 1

B. THE 2001 TENTATIvE DRAFT: ONE STEP FORWARD, Two
STEPS BACK?

1. Doctrinal Analysis
Schwartz initiated and defended his move to demote duty
in the 1999 Discussion Draft. 10 7 His continued defense of this
move in the 2001 Tentative Draft (in light of criticism like
Goldberg and Zipursky's) is more coherent, and more
entrenched, than in 1999.108 Schwartz's defense partially
106. See Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 52 F.3d 463, 469-70 (2d Cir. 1995)
(affirming the district court and holding that the defendant airline owed the
injured plaintiff only a "duty to act reasonably under the circumstances"
(quoting Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 179, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1994))).
Schwartz pointed to other sources to support his proposition that
American negligence doctrine contemplates only a general duty to refrain from
negligent conduct. First, Schwartz denied that the Restatement (Second) of
Torts regards duty as an issue in negligence outside of the context of
affirmative duties (such as duty-to-rescue). See DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra
note 2, § 6, Reporter's Note cmt. a. But cf. supra note 29 (laying out duty as a
prima facie element of negligence in the Second Restatement). Second,
according to Schwartz, even the revered Prosser treatise denies the usefulness
of the duty concept. See DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6, Reporter's Note
cmt. a. Schwartz cites Prosser and Keeton for the proposition that "in
negligence cases the duty is always the same-to conform to the legal
standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk." Id. (quoting
KEETON, supra note 22, at 356). Schwartz contends that "[t]his language,
often quoted by courts, renders the duty concept superfluous." Id. This simple
statement contains two separate propositions that are each tenuously
grounded: that a large number of courts cite this language as a form of
endorsement, and that a sufficiently large number of courts endorse this
language so as to render superfluous the concept of duty as obligation. It is
possible, drawing on Goldberg and Zipursky, that duty in its positive sense
remains doctrinally and functionally salient even in the face of judicial
opposition to the concept.
107. See DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6 cmts. a, c.
108. It does not appear, ALI Director Lance Liebman's observations
notwithstanding, see supra note 18 and accompanying text, that the Wade
Conference criticism yielded a genuine reevaluation of Schwartz's negligence
account, but merely a more developed articulation of the themes in the
Discussion Draft. While the justificatory language in the first Tentative Draft
commentary was augmented to address the concerns raised at the Wade
Conference, the provision's substance remains the same. Schwartz and Green
note Goldberg and Zipursky's article in passing, and observe only that the
authors provide "an extensive citation of recent judicial opinions that set forth
the requirements of duty and breach," and that their article "recommends that
the duty issue be discussed by judges in every case, although the article
acknowledges that in physical-harm cases the discussion will normally be
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appeared in the comments accompanying the negligent liability
provision. 0 9 Schwartz and Green, the co-Reporters responsible
for the first Tentative Draft, were less equivocal in their
insistence that a duty-free negligence provision is not just how
courts should understand negligence (a normative account) but
how they do understand negligence (a positive account). 1 0 In
an interesting turn, Schwartz and Green describe the
equivalence of the concept of "duty" and the "subject to liability"
language in section 6 (section 3 of the Discussion Draft). I '
Schwartz and Green imply that the language "subject to
liability" is a substitute for the concept of duty. It is perhaps
more accurate to say that Schwartz and Green, in order to
relegate duty as an object of assumption, rather than an object
of investigation, create a duty so general-a "duty to avoid
negligence or to exercise reasonable care"-that it ceases to be
functionally meaningful."12
This argument, however, emerged as mere rhetorical
gymnastics-a syllogism based on the false premise that a
general obligation to exercise reasonable care (or to not be
negligent) can adequately replace the doctrinal richness of duty
as obligation. 113 Such rhetorical gymnastics abound in the first
Tentative Draft. For example, consider Schwartz and Green's
assertion that the duty courts recognize is merely a "general
duty" to "avoid negligence" or "exercise reasonable care." 114
Schwartz and Green allege that the Second Restatement

perfunctory and routine." TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 6,
Reporters' Note cmt. d.
109. See, e.g., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 6, Reporters' Note
cmt. d.
110.

"The rule of liability for physical harm stated in

this section

[unchanged from the Discussion Draft's § 3] incorporates the courts'
understanding that persons are under a general duty to exercise reasonable
care." See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 6 cmt. d.

111. They wrote:
To state that a person is under such a [general] duty [to exercise

reasonable care] is equivalent to stating that the person is subject to
liability for negligent conduct that causes physical harm. Given this
equivalence, in physical-harm cases courts may proceed directly to
the standard of liability set forth in this section.

Id.
112.

Id.

113. This gesture seems more of an appeasement of, rather than an
engaged response to, those who defend duty as obligation against the forces of
"no-duty," duty's obverse.
114.

See supra notes 110-12.
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endorses a general duty of reasonable care. 1 5 On this count,
the first Tentative Draft, like the Discussion Draft before it,116
may be bluffing. If the telltale signs of a bluff are overconfident
bidding and mediocre cards, then the note is suspicious. Not
only does the Second Restatement endorse a general duty,
Shwartz and Green argue, this general duty cannot be found in
the Second Restatement as "black-letter doctrine" but is merely
"implicit" in section 281, the section governing liability for
negligence. 17 "To be sure," they continue, "one of [the] specific
elements [in section 281] is that the actor's conduct is negligent
'with respect to' the plaintiff." 18 Schwartz and Green confess
that section 281 does not clarify whether the issue of the
"foreseeable plaintiff' is a feature of duty or of proximate
cause.119 "Modern scholars," Schwartz and Green argue, "tend
to classify the issue under the heading of proximate
12 1
causation," 120 though Justice Cardozo certainly did not.
Schwartz and Green's curious analysis suggests that duty's
"downgrade" from affirmative and obligatory to "general" is not
so much a compromise as it is a step toward duty's actual
demise. 122 "[In light of this [general] duty," Schwartz and
Green continue, "it is exactly proof of the defendant's negligence
that establishes the relevant 'breach."' 123 "Duty" and "breach," it
turns out, mean the same thing; presumably, a finding of a
24
breach suffices to establish a defendant's duty to a plaintiff. 1
Where section 6 disappointed duty proponents, a cursory
glance at section 7 gave cause for hope. Section 7, the first
Tentative Draft's duty provision, bore the most evidence of a
direct response to the duty critics. 125 Comment a, for example,
115.

See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 6, Reporters' Note cmt.

116.
117.

See DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6, Reporter's Note cmt. a.
See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 6, Reporters' Note cmt.

118.
119.

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(b) (1979)).
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 6, Reporters' Note cmt. d.

d.

d.

120. See id.
121. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928)
(designating the issue of the "foreseeable plaintiff' as a question of duty).
122. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
123. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 6 cmt. d (emphasis added).
124. This observation illustrates how (literally) subversive Schwartz and
Green's negligence account is.
125. Section 7 was also substantively revised to a degree. While the
Discussion Draft instructed that even a negligent defendant is not liable to the
plaintiff "if the court determines that the defendant owes no duty to the
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was retitled The ProperRole for Duty. 126 The comment merely
reiterated the section 6 claim that, within the scope of
negligently inflicted physical harm, "courts have recognized a
general duty of reasonable care that operates on the
defendant." 27 Comment a goes further, arguing that because
this general duty lies implicit in standard negligence actions
(and likewise implicit in section 6), "courts can rely directly on
obliged to refer to the general duty on a
[section] 6 and are not
128
case-by-case basis."
Having excised duty as an obligation, Schwartz and Green
now encourage courts to dispense with any reference even to
the lesser "general duty." For example, Schwartz and Green
in
suggest that a judge may find "no duty to the plaintiff, either 129
general or relative to the particular negligence claim."
Ostensibly, this buttresses their account of duty as limitation
on liability. Denials of duty may focus generally on the
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant or may focus
Schwartz and Green
on particular negligence claims. 130
emphasize that these specific denials of duty "preserve other
negligence claims that the plaintiff might have against the
It is not clear whether they offer this
defendant." 13 1
observation as a normative or a positive argument for adopting
132
their account; later language seems to suggest the latter.
Certainly the distinction between general denials of duty and
specific denials of duty fleshes out Schwartz's argument, but as
plaintiff," the Tentative Draft adds, "either in general or relative to the
particular negligence claim." Compare DIsCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6,
with TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 7.

126. TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 1, supra note 16, § 7 cmt. a.
127. Id.
128. Id. This statement is potentially significant; at the very least, it
seems mildly inconsistent with the argument from section 6, comment d, that

the language

"subject to

liability" is functionally

(if not doctrinally)

coterminous with the duty concept. See supra note 111.

129. See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 7.
130.

See id.

131. Id. § 7 cmt. a.
132. See id. In situations where the denial of a particular duty preserves
other negligence claims, "the issue is one of limitations on duty, rather than

the complete absence of duty." Id. In other cases, courts may "profess to find
an absence of duty between the defendant and the plaintiff," but still "courts
may acknowledge that the defendant can be liable to the plaintiff for reckless
conduct; accordingly, those cases as well involve limitations on duty rather
than denials of duty altogether." Id. This language unmistakably presages
the second Tentative Draft and suggests the hand of Green. See TENTATIVE
DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. a.
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a justificatory matter it falls short. 133 Furthermore, because
the distinction remains contingent on the validity of the larger
argument that duty's proper role is one of "no-duty," the
distinction between general and specific denials of duty is
largely cosmetic.
Another example of such a cosmetic argument appears in
the final paragraph of comment a. Schwartz notes that
determinations of no-duty need not always cut against the
plaintiff. "[0]n occasion no-duty determinations can also focus
on the plaintiff. By relieving the plaintiff of the obligation to
act reasonably by way of self-protection, such holdings function
to eliminate the defense of comparative responsibility that
otherwise would diminish the plaintiffs recovery." 134 This
observation, however, like the one comparing general denials of
duty to specific ones, serves only to beg the question: Just
because a court's decision not to obligate a plaintiff to engage in
self-protection can be characterized as a "no-duty" policy
determination does not indicate why one should so characterize
a decision, and certainly not why such characterizations should
drive negligence doctrine, all other things being equal.
2. Structural Analysis
The first Tentative Draft's quasi-structural changes fare
somewhat better. The Discussion Draft's subtitle, General
Principles,has been replaced with Liability for Physical Harm
(Basic Principles).135 Compared to the Discussion Draft, the
Tentative Draft places greater emphasis on the limits of the
scope of its negligence provisions. 136 This scope is limited in
133. It is conceivable that this sub-argument
descriptive, rather than justificatory.
134.

TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16,

§

was intended to be

7 cmt. a; see also TENTATIVE

DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. h (Plaintiff Negligence and No-Duty
Determinations).
135. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, at i; see also FIRST TENTATIVE
DRAFT FOREWORD, supra note 5, at xiii (explaining that the new title is designed to "convey more accurately [the Restatement's] intended scope").
136. See supra note 135. Schwartz and Green observed that

just as the general standard of liability stated in this section is
limited to physical harm, the general duty of reasonable care is
affirmed only in cases involving physical harm.

In cases involving

negligence that causes emotional distress or economic loss, there is no
rule of liability that is as general as this section's physical-harm rule.
Accordingly, in such cases courts need to consider whether there is
any particular rule of liability that is applicable. In providing this
consideration, courts frequently employ the terminology of duty in
explaining whether liability is or is not available.
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two important ways. First, like the Discussion Draft, the
Tentative Draft's negligence provisions are limited to liability
for physical harm (as opposed to economic or emotional loss).137
Second, the Tentative Draft purports to restate the "basic,"
rather than "general" principles of the cases falling within that
scope. 138 The substitution of "basic" for "general" (in addition to
the inclusion of Liability for Physical Harm in the subtitle)
seems to respond directly to Goldberg and Zipursky's structural
criticism; the Restatement no longer claims to articulate the
"general" principles of tort law, but merely the "basic"
principles of those cases falling within the intended scope. This
cosmetic change, however, does not adequately address the
question of why the heart of the Restatement should be
directed at those categories of cases that are least controversial
and, presumably, the least in need of clarification.
Nonetheless, the scope limitations might still buttress the
project's internal coherence. Schwartz and Green circumvent
Goldberg and Zipursky's doctrinal criticism with a structural
response-they reclarify the project's scope and illustrate the
coincidence of the generality of the scope of cases covered by
section 6 and the generality of the duty specified by the same
section.
It is not clear if this argument is as externally coherent as
it is internally coherent. Conceding that a different rule of
liability applies to cases outside the purported scope of the
Restatement than to those within that scope does not justify
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 6 cmt. d. In a familiar rhetorical
turn, Schwartz and Green suggest that even in those cases for which the duty
discussion is indispensable, courts do not really talk about duty but merely
"employ the terminology of duty." Id.
137.

See TENTATIVE DRAFT No.

1, supra note 16, § 6 (Liability for

Negligent Physical Harm); FIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT FOREWORD, supra note 5,
at xiii (conceiving the Third Restatement as a "new doctrinal elaboration of
the core subject of the law of torts, liability for physical harm" (emphasis

added)). In comment d, the Reporters state,
[J]ust as the general standard of liability stated in this section is
limited to physical harm, the general duty of reasonable care is
affirmed only in cases involving physical harm. In cases involving the
negligence that causes emotional distress or emotional loss, there is
no rule of liability that is as general as this section's physical-harm
rule.
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 6 cmt. d. The Tentative Draft, by its
very title, purports to restate the "basic," rather than "general," principles of
the cases falling within the scope. Compare DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2,
at i, with TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, at i.
138. See supra note 137.
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the initial inclusion and exclusion.
Schwartz's "scope"
argument may successfully rebuff Goldberg and Zipursky's
doctrinal argument but it does not adequately dispose of their
larger structural complaint.
Furthermore, the first Tentative Draft continues to reveal
139
Schwartz's underlying hostility toward the concept of duty.
According to Schwartz, cases involving emotional distress or
economic loss may implicate a different "rule of liability" than
cases involving physical harm, and courts need to consider if
"liability is or is not available." 140 Duty is further abstracted
because courts might use "the terminology of duty" to explain a
new rule of liability, but their use of the terminology does not
mean they are actually talking about duty.141 Schwartz implies
a false judicial consciousness surrounding the concept of duty,
notwithstanding his admission that "the duty issue requires
explicit attention" in cases of duty-to-rescue or "unusual
cases."1 42 Schwartz takes back almost as much ground as he
appears to give. Regardless, even with the scope clarifications,
the first Tentative Draft is vulnerable to Goldberg and
143
Zipursky's structural critique.
In sum, the first Tentative Draft does not reflect any
changes in the provisional language of the Discussion Draft.
Further, substantive changes to the Tentative Draft are found
in the commentary and are more appropriately characterized
as justificatory, instead of revisionist. One must ask, "Has
Duty drawn its last breath?"
C. THE 2002 TENTATIVE DRAFT

If the 2002 Tentative Draft was not the substantive
revision Goldberg and Zipursky might have hoped for, they can
take heart that it takes their criticism seriously, something the
2001 Tentative Draft arguably did not do.
Ultimately,
however, the second Tentative Draft's greatest achievement is
the sophistication with which it disposes of duty while
appearing to preserve it.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See
See
See
See

supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 1, supra note 16, § 6 cmt. d.
supra note 113 and accompanying text.
TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 1, supra note 16, § 6 cmt. d; see also supra

notes 96-98 and accompanying text (describing the Discussion Draft's
introduction of the concepts of, and distinction between, duty-to-rescue cases
and unusual cases).
143.

See supra Part II.A.
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Sections 6 and 7 of the first Tentative Draft (addressing
liability for negligence and duty, respectively) were the only
sections not to survive the 2001 annual ALI meeting. 144 The
ALI has not explained what about the first Tentative Draft's
treatment of negligent liability and duty its members found so
"controversial," 145 but presumably at least some of its members
shared Goldberg and Zipursky's general concern that Schwartz
(and Green) had gone too far. The 2002 Tentative Draft
demonstrates an attempt at compromise.
Strikingly, section 6 now presents negligence as a fiveelement tort 146 (rather than the three-element tort its
predecessors had embraced147). "An actor ordinarily has a duty
to exercise reasonable care,"1 48 unless the court determines
under section 7 "that the duty of reasonable care is
inapplicable," in which case an actor is subject to liability if his
144. SECOND TENTATIVE DRAFT FOREWORD, supra note 16, at xiii-iv; see
also supra note 19. Director Liebman assured the ALI Members that the
sectional "language has changed and evolved over the past 12 months,
receiving serious and constructively critical attention" from several sources.
SECOND TENTATIVE DRAFT FOREWORD, supra note 16, at xiv.

Later in the

foreword, Liebman waxed nostalgic with the reflective language that similarly
characterizes the new sections 6 and 7:
[T]he topics here presented are basic to any effort to conceive and
analyze the legal regulation of interpersonal conduct. It is fascinating
to see how the thinking and the words have developed in the three
quarters of a century that span Restatements First, Second, and
Third. Gary Schwartz was doing, and Mike Green and Bill Powers
are now continuing, work that explains the ideas we hold about social
duty and responsibility at this period in history. This has always
been and continues to be the central focus of the Institute.
Id. For examples of the second Tentative Draft's softer touch, perhaps the
mark of Green, see TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 1, § 6 cmt. c,
discussing the "[h]istorical role of negligence as basis for liability." See also id.
§ 6 cmt. d (describing the "[r]ationales" for imposing liability for negligence
conduct).
145. See supra note 19.
146. See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 6. Section 6, Liability for
Negligent Conduct, states in full,
An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the
actor's conduct poses a risk of physical harm. Unless the court determines under § 7 that the duty of reasonable care is inapplicable, an
actor whose failure to exercise reasonable care is a factual cause of
physical harm is subject to liability for any such harm within the
scope of liability.
Id.
147. See supra note 50 (describing the Discussion Draft's three-element
characterization of negligence).
148. See TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 1, § 6(a).
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failure to exercise reasonable care is both the factual and
proximate cause of harm. 149 Comment b, titled Elements of a
Prima Facie Claim for Negligently Caused Physical Harm,150
emphasizes that section 6 includes the "five" prima facie
negligence elements.1 51 "[S]ubsection (a)," comment b declares,
"addresses the first element, duty."' 5 2
Has the ALI caved? Has duty been restored to the
doctrinally preeminent gatekeeper function that, according to
Goldberg and Zipursky, it so richly deserves? Hardly. Duty is
still just the obligation "to exercise reasonable care" and, more
153
importantly, still "does not require attention from the court."
149. Id. § 6(b). The second Tentative Draft does not use the phrase
.proximate cause," but instead refers to harm "within the scope of liability."
Id. Green and Powers note later that while issues of scope of liability are
"most often described as 'proximate cause' by judges, lawyers, and legal
scholars .... the term 'proximate cause' has rarely been used in prior
Restatements." Id. at 191 special note on proximate cause. The Reporters
concede that "the term 'proximate cause' has been in widespread use in
judicial opinions, treatises, casebooks and scholarship," but decline to use it
"because it is an especially poor [term] to describe the idea to which it is
connected." Id. The term is included in a parenthetical following the real
title, Scope of Liability, "to communicate clearly with judges, lawyers, and
academics who understand limitations on liability under the proximate-cause
rubric." Id. With a touch of what can only be described as desperation, the
Reporters note that "[tihe Institute fervently hopes that the Restatement
Fourth of Torts will not find this parenthetical necessary." Id. In this
particular instance, the balance between positivist legal description and
normative prescription, see supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text, seems
to have swung completely toward a specific legal agenda, abandoning a wellestablished legal term almost everyone knew and with which almost everyone,
presumably, was fairly comfortable (even if "proximate cause" continues to
evade comprehension conceptually).
150. The title of this comment and its reference to "elements,"
unprecedented in the Third Restatement project, is an undeniable reference to
section 281 of the Second Restatement and its Statement of the Elements of a
Cause of Action for Negligence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281
(1979).
151. See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 6 cmt. b.
152. Id. The Reporters, covering familiar ground, note that "[diuty is a
question of law for the court to determine." Id. Unfortunately for those still
harboring hope, not only is an actor merely under a "duty to exercise
reasonable care" but the duty "does not [ordinarily] require attention from the
court." Id.
153. Id. Section 6, comment f affirms that
[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care. That is
equivalent to saying that an actor is subject to liability for negligent
conduct that causes physical harm. Thus, in cases involving physical
harm, courts ordinarily need not be concerned with the existence or
content of the ordinary duty.
Id. § 6 cmt. f.
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Green and Power's rhetorical sophistication and subtlety
reveals an interesting theme in the second Tentative Draft that
was only nascent in previous drafts. In distinguishing the
"legal" element of duty from the "factual" elements of breach,
harm, and causation, Green and Powers imbue duty with
dueling personalities. Prior drafts held fast to the proposition54
that duty constituted, in Schwartz's words, a "non-issue";
however, by highlighting duty as "a question of law for the
court to determine," 155 Green and Powers entice the courts to
take charge of negligence claims by their original horns-duty.
Hence, in a comment to section 7, Green and Powers cite "noduty rules and the scope-of-liability doctrines (often called
'proximate cause')" as the "two different legal doctrines for
56
withholding liability."'
157
Further, their account of duty's "[p]rocedural aspects"
sends similar mixed messages. Though comment b to section 6
identifies duty as the "first element" of negligence, 58 section 7
places upon the defendant the "procedural obligation to raise
the [no-duty] issue."1 59 This procedural obligation reinforces
the idea that duty functions (as a presumptive matter of a
plaintiffs prima facie negligence claim) 60 more as an
affirmative defense than as an element of a plaintiffs case.
Section 7 ignores the same incongruent duality it
establishes: duty as an element and duty as a non-element.
For example, the Reporters' note to comment b cites the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the proposition that
plaintiffs alleging an action in negligence need not plead duty,
but also describes duty as a "necessary element of the plaintiffs
case." 16 1 Furthermore, comment b alleges that resting the "no-

154. See e.g., DIScUSsION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6 cmt. a.
Schwartz titled comment a, Duty as a Non-Issue. Id.

155.
156.

Professor

TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 6 cmt. b.
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. a. For a discussion of

the terminology "proximate cause," see supra note 148.
157. See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. b.

158.
159.

See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. b.

160. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. The Reporters astutely
observe, "[A] plaintiff claiming negligence is not obliged to include an
allegation that the defendant had a duty of reasonable care," let alone an
allegation that the defendant owed the plaintiff a stronger form of affirmative
duty. See TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 1, § 7, Reporters' Note b (citing
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9 note).
161. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 7, Reporters' Note cmt. b.
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duty" burden with the defendant "should provide adequate
notice to the plaintiff that the defendant claims he or she did
not owe [the] plaintiff a duty of reasonable care." 162 This
defense sounds more like a challenge to one of the elements of
the plaintiffs prima facie case than an affirmative defense of
"no-duty."
Green and Powers assert, however, that their proposal
does not reestablish duty as an element of negligence. In
Section 7, comment b, they refer to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(a), analogizing the existence of duty to the
"capacity to sue or compliance with conditions precedent in a
contract, which are presumed to exist." 163 This "compromise,"
though, merely reveals the radical nature of their proposal;
precedent only
comparing duty to a contractual condition
164
muddies the waters, rather than stills them.
Section 7 offers further evidence of duty's obscured status.
The Reporters' comments c-g to section 7 "explain a number of
the factors relevant to... determinations" of no-duty.165 Prototypically, comment c observes that, "[i]n deciding whether to
adopt a no-duty rule, courts often refer to general social norms
of responsibility." 166 For example, commercial distributors of
alcohol have a different duty to avoid injury to motorists than
do social hosts. 167 Courts have traditionally, however, also
referred to general norms of social responsibility in
determining that a plaintiff cannot satisfy the now-famous first
element of negligence. 168 Comment e, RelationalLimitations, is
section 7's soft spot. "Courts," Green and Powers allege,
"sometimes use the rubric of duty to decide whether an
162. Id. § 7 cmt. b.
163. Id. § 7, Reporters' Note cmt. b. Such a contract plaintiff "is permitted
to plead generally compliance with all conditions precedent, leaving to
defendant the obligation to provide notice of any specific condition, compliance
with which the defendant seeks to put in issue." Id. (citing 2 JOHN W. STRONG
ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 414 n.16 (5th ed. 1999)). It is very
difficult to understand how this framework clarifies, rather than obfuscates,
the proper role for duty in negligence doctrine.
164.

See supra note 162.

165. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. a; see also id. § 7 cmt. c
(Conflicts with Social Norms About Responsibility); id. § 7 cmt. d (Conflicts
with Another Domain of Law); id. § 7 cmt. e (Relational Limitations); id. § 7

cmt. f (Administrability); id. § 7 cmt. g (Deference to Discretionary Decisions
of Another Branch of Government).
166. Id. § 7 cmt. c.
167.

See id.

168. See id.
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otherwise negligent actor should be liable to a class of persons
in a certain relationship."'169 For example, a property owner's
duty may extend to persons on the property for the owner's
benefit but not to a trespasser; a home owner may owe a duty
to an adjacent landowner to avoid negligently starting a fire,
but may not owe the same duty to a firefighter. 170 "Thus, an
actor may have a duty of reasonable care to some persons but
not to others." 7 ' The idea that an individual's duty goes only
so far is as old as Palsgraf 172 The Third Restatement project
has, since the beginning, resisted the idea that negligence may
be tied to particular relationships. 173 According to Schwartz,
the "relational" camp includes Goldberg and Zipursky. 174
Though both Tentative Drafts include this brief relational
discussion, they both omit any reference to Goldberg and
Zipursky.
In a final attempt to soften their "no-duty" position and
mollify the duty critics, Green and Powers forcefully extend an
idea introduced in the first Tentative Draft. 175 That Draft
introduced the idea that judges need not dispose of duty
entirely, they may merely "modify" it.176 The second Tentative

Draft now acknowledges that a court may determine that an
actor "has no duty or a duty other than the ordinary duty of
reasonable care." 177 Under this language, a defendant is not
169. Id. § 7 cmt. e; see also § 7 cmt. a ("When addressing duty, courts
sometimes focus on the relationship between the actor and the person
harmed.").
170. Id. § 7 cmt. b.
171. Id. § 7 cmt. e.
172. See supra notes 120-21; see also supra note 78 (describing the

Mussivand court's discussion of the expiration of duty).
173.

See, e.g., DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6, Reporter's Note cmt. a

(noting that while some scholars affirm the importance of relationships in
duty analysis, "others question this finding"); TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra
note 1, § 6 cmt. e; TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 6, Reporters' Note
cmt. d.
174. See DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 2, § 6, Reporter's Note cmt. a
(citing John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of
MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1825-46 (1998)).
175. See supra notes 16, 132 (noting Green's influence on the first

Tentative Draft).
176. See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 16, § 7 cmt. a.
177. See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 7. The full text of section
7 "duty" reads,

A court may determine that an actor has no duty or a duty other than
the ordinary duty of reasonable care. Determinations of no duty and
modifications of the duty of reasonable care are unusual and are
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liable to a plaintiff where "a court determines the defendant
owes 'no-duty' to the plaintiff'; if a court finds a defendant
possesses a "modified duty, the defendant is subject to liability
only for breach of the modified duty." i78
"Courts," the
Reporters suggest, "also sometimes hold that an actor has a
limited duty, such as an obligation to avoid engaging in
v9
reckless conduct that causes physical harm."'
Section 7 magically transforms recklessness from a
doctrinally distinct mental state to a limited duty of reasonable
care. This doctrinal slight of hand recalls the debate over the
central mission of the Restatement project. 180 If the purpose of
the Restatement is to distill basic tort principles (and clarify
particularly challenging doctrines), and the purpose of these
sections of the Third Restatement in particular is an account of
negligence, then re-imagining recklessness as a "modification"
of negligence serves only to obfuscate, rather than reveal, the
81
distinction between recklessness and negligence.
To make matters worse, the Reporters' "modified duty"
concept commingles several concepts, such as the distinction
between general and specific duties. 8 2 Sometimes, courts focus
on particular claims of negligence, forbidding some but
preserving others. Thus, a court might hold that a product
seller has no duty to warn about risks an ordinary consumer
would already know, but still has a duty to exercise reasonable
care in designing the product." 8 3 It is almost impossible to
understand how the "no-duty" rubric helps to clarify this
convoluted area of duty doctrine. Why, for example, is it

based on special problems of principle or policy that warrant denying
liability or limiting the ordinary duty of care in a particular class of
cases. A defendant is not liable for any harm caused if the court
determines the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff, either in
general or in relation to the particular negligence claim. If the court
determines a defendant is subject to a modified duty, the defendant is
subject to liability only for breach of the modified duty.

Id.
178. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 7.
179. Id. cmt. a; see also id. § 7 cmt. b, illus. 1 (comparing liability based on
negligence and liability based on "willful and wanton" conduct).

180. See supra Part I.B.
181. Cf. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. d (noting the
influence of property law on the administration of claims involving owners and

occupiers of land and emphasizing that "En]o-duty and limited-duty rules help
police the boundaries between.., various areas of law").
182. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
183. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. a.
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preferable to describe a product seller as having a duty to
exercise reasonable care in designing a product but "no-duty" to
an ordinary consumer when the risks of the product are
apparent? Might it be more coherent to describe the product
seller's duty as encompassing the risks associated with the
original design of a product but not extending to those risks
known to an ordinary consumer? 84 The modified duty concept
even resuscitates the prominence of relational factors in duty
185
analysis.
Despite these criticisms, the first Tentative Draft took
important steps toward assuaging the concerns of those
scholars, like Goldberg and Zipursky, who seek to reaffirm the
primacy of duty in negligence law. The 2002 Tentative Draft
undeniably took greater steps toward achieving a compromise
between Schwartz's original 1999 Discussion Draft position and
the stand taken by Professors Goldberg and Zipursky.
CONCLUSION
The Third Restatement project can thus far be
characterized as inching toward duty. The Discussion Draft
proffered a relatively radical account of negligence and duty, its
characterizations of duty's role and duty's scope going hand in
hand. On one hand, the Discussion Draft indicated defendants
owed plaintiffs merely a "duty of reasonable care"-more
substantive duties, labeled affirmative duties, were reserved
for more complicated cases implicating duty-to-warn and dutyto-rescue. On the other hand, the duty owed to plaintiffs by
defendants is so general it can be assumed in most run-of-themill cases.
The first Tentative Draft took minor steps toward
reconciling Schwartz, Goldberg and Zipursky's disparate
conceptions of duty and negligence. Though the first Tentative
Draft purported to address both Goldberg and Zipursky's
doctrinal and structural concerns, its modifications were mostly
cosmetic. The second Tentative Draft took the duty critics
more seriously. Unfortunately, the ALI continues to hold fast
to its inventive account of negligence and duty. The second
Tentative Draft's changes serve only to make more palatable
the bitter taste of duty's dismissal.

184.
185.

See id.
See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.

